

## NUCLEAR TEST TALKS

Soviet delegate Tsarapkin at the Geneva test talks has dropped all pretense of serious interest in concluding an agreement and is seeking to induce the US [redacted] to take the initiative in initiating the negotiations. He charged on 12 June that the West now is interested only in ending the talks and placing the blame on the USSR.

At the same session Tsarapkin formally introduced the Soviet aide-memoire of 4 June on nuclear testing which was handed to the US at the conclusion of the President's talks with Khrushchev in Vienna. This memorandum proposed that,

in view of the failure to reach an agreement on a test ban, the powers take up the "cardinal question" of general and complete disarmament and settle the disarmament and nuclear test problems interdependently.

The Soviet memorandum stated that the USSR would agree to sign a general disarmament treaty including Western proposals on the cessation of nuclear testing and implied that a test ban could be part of the first stage of such a treaty. Tsarapkin contended that these proposals demonstrated the USSR's flexibility and "constructive approach" and denied any intention of issuing an ultimatum. He stressed,

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however, that the West has the choice of either signing a test ban treaty on Soviet terms or merging these talks with negotiations on general disarmament.

The Soviet proposal is clearly aimed at prolonging the present uncontrolled moratorium on testing. Moscow probably also calculates that the opening of bilateral Soviet-US disarmament talks on 19 June and the international conference on general disarmament scheduled to begin on 31 July in Geneva will act as a brake on any US move to resume nuclear weapons tests this summer.

The Soviet move to terminate separate negotiations on the nuclear test issue by submerging them in the complex subject of general disarmament probably springs from two main considerations. Now that Khrushchev has restored top-level contact with the US by his meeting with the President, which he believes will open the way for negotiations on the key political issues of Berlin and Germany, he has no further interest in keeping the test talks alive as a means of promoting an accommodation with Washington.

Another and probably more important motivating factor is Communist China's long-standing opposition to a test ban without the complete destruction of all existing nuclear weapon stockpiles--a condition which Peiping insists on in order to preclude a test ban agreement. This issue seems to have played a major role in the long and bitter Sino-Soviet dispute last year, and a commitment by Khrushchev to downgrade and eventually withdraw from separate talks on nuclear testing may have been an important element in the behind-the-scenes compromise worked out at the Moscow meeting of Communist leaders last November. The Moscow Declaration called for "banning

atomic weapons as well as their tests and production," but, in contrast to the statement issued by the 1957 conference of Communist chiefs, it failed to endorse a test ban alone.

Moscow's reduced interest in a test cessation treaty was evident in the months following the Moscow conference. Two weeks before the latest round of talks opened at Geneva last March, Khrushchev, in a talk with Ambassador Thompson at Novosibirsk, adopted a pessimistic attitude toward the possibility of an agreement and minimized the importance of the issue. Furthermore, Khrushchev for the first time singled out French tests as an obstacle to agreement. When the talks resumed, the Soviet delegation followed up Khrushchev's remarks and charged that French testing was a serious impediment to agreement. In addition, the Soviets withdrew their previous consent to a single administrator and proposed to substitute a three-member administrative council with a built-in Soviet veto.

After the Western powers tabled a number of important revisions in their position in order to meet previous Soviet objections, the Soviet delegate refused to negotiate on the details of implementation, insisting on the standard gambit of recording "agreement in principle," despite important unresolved points. Privately, the Soviets took pains to emphasize that Moscow did not intend to break off the talks, and the French test in late April passed with only routine Soviet criticism.

Tsarapkin made no effort to respond to the new Western concessions on the main issues before the conference, or to offer serious counterproposals. Instead, he virtually ignored the Western position and began to reiterate at great length the new Soviet position. On

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15 May the Soviets reverted to the question of French testing, warning in an official government statement that further testing would make a treaty "impossible" and might compel the USSR to resume its own weapons tests. In preparation for the meeting between the President and Khrushchev, Tsarapkin delivered an 80-minute review of the conference, which suggested that the USSR was prepared to maintain its position during the Vienna talks.

The USSR's unyielding attitude was confirmed by Khrushchev's statements during the Vienna talks and in the aide-memoire to the US. The memorandum suggested three "fundamental issues" the USSR would insist that the West accept.

On the question of a temporary moratorium on small underground tests, the memorandum reaffirmed that the Soviet Government "is firmly convinced" that at the expiration of the moratorium, the three powers should not automatically be released from their commitment to cease underground testing. This argument is consistent with the long-standing Soviet insistence that any treaty must ban "weapons tests of all kinds, everywhere and for all time." Its current position would have the effect of extending the ban on underground tests indefinitely, regardless of whether detection techniques could be sufficiently improved during the moratorium so as to control such tests effectively.

The memorandum also described again the Soviet proposals for three inspections in the USSR as "adequate guarantees" against violations and called for the US to adopt a "realistic approach" to the issue. Since the Soviets introduced the quota of three inspections in July 1960, various officials have hinted that the specific number would be subject to bargaining. However,

when the US introduced a new formula for calculating the number of inspections which could have the effect of scaling down the number for the USSR to a range of 12-20, the Soviet delegation promptly rejected it as "unrealistic" and called for a renunciation of the "technical approach" to inspections. He stated that the crux of the matter was the difference of approach and that unless the Western delegations were willing to solve this phase of the problem on the basis of a political compromise, no agreement was in sight.

A major portion of the Soviet aide-memoire was devoted to the so-called "troika" proposal for a three-member administrative council. In the same vein as Khrushchev's remarks to Walter Lippmann in April, the memorandum declared that "while there are neutral states, there are not nor can there be neutral men." The memorandum replied to the Western objection to a veto by claiming that if the Soviet inspection quota proposal is agreed on, inspections will proceed "without any voting." On other questions on which the executive will have to make decisions, however, the memorandum stated that the tripartite proposals will prevent "arbitrariness" in such cases.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko frankly admitted in a conversation with Secretary Rusk in Vienna on 3 June that the USSR is seeking a veto. He said if there were no veto aspects to the Soviet proposal, it would make no sense. He asserted that one-third representation was the USSR's "natural right," and that while he did not describe it as a demand, the USSR was very firm on this point.

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